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To ensure world peace and security in twenty-first century, hostile relationship between the two 
major civilizations in the world today should be managed. Considering the geographical distribution of 
Muslims in the world today, we can see on the top of the world’s known fuel deposits, most important 
trade routes – the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Bosporus, the Black Sea, and the Straits of Malacca 
– are all heavily populated by Muslims. Over the past half-century, many events have highlighted the 
role of Islam as a cultural and political force in international affairs. They have generated debates and 
discourses, many of which fall under polemics and apologetics. To understand how and why certain 
anti-rational tendencies have gained ground in the Islamic world, we need to consider their historical 
and socio-political context, including the official state policies, notably the attempts to crush major 
mainstream Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the cancellation of 
Algeria’s elections. This paper aims to present a critical reading of some of the problems faced by the 
Muslim world and their impacts on international system. The method of approach in this paper is 
descriptive with explaining the relationship among International relations, Islam, peace and security.  
 
 




1. THE POLITICAL RETURN OF RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
   
There is a complex relationship between religion and international politics. The 
implication of the first side of the debate is that religion, Islam in this case, has to be studied 
as an independent and vital force in international relations. If Islam is the driving force 
behind political phenomenon, it must also have a role in international political process. The 
counter argument would go like this: Islam is important for the analysis of international 
relations only if we recognize that its role is shaped by economic, political and social 
developments which are unrelated to the precepts of the religion. Therefore, religion should 
not be privileged as an independent field of study in the context of international politics. 
However, a close study demonstrates how there is an Islamic impact on the study of 
international politics including peace and conflict, nationalism, nation-states and human 
rights. 
Islam has emerged, therefore, with a ‘political profile’ to the international scene. This 
heightened profile is due to various factors (Beeley 1992: 11-29). Among them is the post 
1973 realization of the importance of the oil resources of the Muslim world, first and 
foremost, in the Middle East, and more recently in the republics of Central Asia. This wealth 
has contributed to the establishment of Muslim commercial as well as financial, economic 
and civic organization in Europe and North America. For instance, the OPEC has played a 
significant role in the world politics and finance. This economic power has been 
                                                          
* This paper was edited by Dr. Masoud Khalili, PhD in TEFL in the Department of English Language, 
University of Guilan. 
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accompanied by a desire among some Muslims for Islamic revivalism, a greater genuineness 
in the understanding and implementation of the social, moral, political, and economic 
imperatives to discover in the Qur’an. 
On the other hand, the Muslim world is spread across the three continents of Europe, 
Africa and Asia, with sizeable Muslim communities in the Americas, India and China. The 
Middle East region and Southeast Asia form the heartlands of this faith; Saudi Arabia is the 
birthplace of Islam, and Indonesia the populous Muslim country with 90 percent of its 188 
million people being Muslim. The geography of the faith, however, has been experiencing 
some changes in recent years. The emergence of a Muslim-dominated Bosnian entity in 
former Yugoslavia and the regeneration of Muslim Albania in southern part of Europe are 
recent additions to what has been Turkey’s lonely spot in Europe as the continent’s only 
Muslim state (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 16-17).  
The emergence of Muslim republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia has practically 
transformed the map of west Asia. Five new Central Asian republics have been joined by 
Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. These states are not Muslim in the classic sense of the word, 
where Islam would be the dominant cultural influence. But they are in any case much more 
in tune with secularist Turkey and still far removed form the traditionalist Islamic forces in 
the Arab World. But their emergence does represent an expansion of the Muslim world in 
geographical terms, and terms of a quantitative growth in the number of independent Muslim 
states operating in the international system.1
It should be mentioned that economically, too, the differences between Muslim states are 
quite marked. The newly industrializing Muslim countries, for instance, are spearheading 
part of the Third World challenge to Western domination of the capitalist world economy. 
Muslim states in this category include Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey in the Middle East and 
North Africa, and Malaysia, Indonesia and possibly Pakistan in Asia.  
 This fact can be ascertained by the growing 
number of member-states participating at the organization of Islamic countries’ meetings. 
The birth of these six Islamic states and the addition of their 70 million people to the Muslim 
world will, in the fullness of time, begin to have an impact on the direction and policies 
pursued by the established Muslim states. Their presence will also influence the orientation 
and ethos of such hitherto Arab-dominated international Muslim organizations as the 54-
member Islamic Conference Organization (Eickelman and Piscatori 1997: 44-45). 
Then there are two other types of economic states in the Muslim world: the survivor 
economy which is the prevalent from in much of Muslim Africa and the stagnant or under-
performing Muslim economies, the latter being characteristic of some of the Arab World’s 
economies. Accounting to more than a dozen Muslim states and many millions of Muslims 
in Asia and Africa, these groups of countries either suffer from a natural resource deficiency, 
or else find that their economies are unable to respond to the multitude of pressures which 
are increasingly generated at the global level. They simply do not have the means to assess, 
let alone respond to, the challenges that a globalized international system poses. Tragically, 
in most of these cases, poverty continues to prevail, despite a liberalization and opening up 
of their economies.  
                                                          
1 In the Twenty-first century, almost one out of every five human being is a Muslim, and a quarter of 
the human race will probably become Muslim. The new demographic presence of Islam within the 
Western World is indicative that the Islamization is now a major globalizing force. In the second half 
of the twentieth century both Muslim migration to the West and conversions to Islam within the West 
consolidated a new Islamic presence.   




A number of other Muslim economies, on the other hand, have been doing quite well, 
because of oil deposits.2  By and large, these economies have prospered because they have 
been blessed with huge hydrocarbon deposits, which were the main source of their wealth 
and income in the twentieth century, and will likely be in the next century as well (George 
1996: 79). Moreover, the ranks of the Middle Eastern oil states have been expanded in the 
1990s by the gradual arrival on the international hydrocarbons scene of potentially serious 
players such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for example, are said to exceed 50 billion barrels 
of oil, or could even be as treat as 200 billion barrels. The economic ambitions of these 
newly independent states are likely to project them to prominence as some of the next 
century’s main hydrocarbons providers. But their arrival as large hydrocarbon exporters may 
bring them into a devastating competition with the established Middle Eastern hydrocarbons 
exporters, all of whom are, of course, Muslim states (Esposito and Voll 2002: 33-39). This 




2. ISLAMISM IN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The great zones of Muslim culture with which European powers had been engaged were 
the Ottomans (1281-1923), the Safavids (1501-1722) in Iran, the Mughals (1526-1857) in 
Indian sub-continent, and Southeast Asia. Of these, the most powerful in relation to Europe 
was the Ottoman, which for centuries ruled major areas of southern Europe, Greece and the 
Balkans, together with the Fertile Crescent, the Hejaz and with it the Holy places of Mecca 
and Medina, Egypt and North Africa. 
The severity of British reprisals against the mutineers resulted in many Muslim leaders 
leaving the sub-continent for the Holy Land and other regions of the Middle-East. It set 
divisive forces at work among the Muslim and Hindu communities of the region, and marked 
the beginning of a long history of religious and political movements in the struggle against 
British rule. Ultimately, in 1947, it was to lead to partition, the creation of the nation states of 
India and Pakistan, and eruption of the festering sore of Kashmir as a focus for Islamic-
Hindu hostility. 
The turn down of the Ottoman Empire was sluggish. It was in part due to domestic 
weakness, rise of nationalism in its European provinces such as Greece and the Balkans, and 
the rapid expansion of the European powers. An internal assault came from the radical 
puritanical movement set in train by Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787) which 
became a religious ideology of tribal unification in north central Arabia, and in 1773 
captured Riyad, making it its capital. An external challenge to Ottoman authority was 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, which led to the installation of Muhammad Ali, and 
Albanian, as governor of Egypt (1805-1848). During the course of the nineteenth century 
areas of Eastern Europe under Ottoman rule, such as Greece and the Balkans, revolted and 
gained their independence and asserted their cultural identity. Ottoman decline was hastened 
                                                          
2 The oil boom in the Middle East during the 1970s which sparked renewed interest in Islam(?) 
encouraged the development of a loosely knit interconnected network of Muslim international 
businessmen who working for oil and chemical companies as well as financial firms, gained 
experience in Western regulatory and business environments.   
3 Therefore, several of these new Central Asian countries see themselves as leading regional economies 
of the twenty-first century, with potential to emerge as new economic powers of Asia.  
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by the British foment of the revolt of the Arabs during the First World War. The Allied 
victory led to divisions of the Fertile Crescent in their interests of the metropolitan powers, 
Britain and France, thus setting the scene for a number of the geo-political problems of the 
contemporary Muslim world. In the wake of the First World War, Mustafa Kemal, later 
known as Ataturk formally abolished the Ottoman sultanate in 1923, and the position of 
Caliph, held by the Sultan has gone in 1924. 
The British mandate in Palestine opened the door to the implementation of the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917 that envisage a national home for the Jews in Palestine. This, in 1948, in 
the wake of the Holocaust, was to lead to the establishment of the state of Israel as a home 
for the Jewish survivors from Europe, generating an exodus of Palestinians from their 
homeland, many of whom continue to be refugees. Another consequence was the opportunity 
given to Ibn Sa’ud, with his support of the Wahhabi current, to create the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. The Kingdom has gained a prestige in the Islamic world totally disproportionate to 
its population and cultural status by its custodianship of the holy places and especially after 
1973, its oil wealth. 
The religious consciousness and self-perception of Muslims have been transformed from 
the 1960s. To be a Muslim at that time was largely an observance of the ritual law, which to 
the outside observer often did not go beyond observance of the daily prayer and the Fast of 
Ramadan. It seems that Islam has returned to different debates in international relations. In 
fact, we can trace Islam’s international political influence over the last 70 decades. World 
War II was a watershed, and in this regard and we can note that the two decades after the end 
of the war, with the power of the European colonial powers visibly on the wane, Islam was 
used in the pursuit of numerous anti-colonial struggles, typically in the service of indigenous 
nationalism. There were prominent examples of Islam’s involvement in political conflicts 
from the 1960s and 1970. Two issues in particular highlighted the vibrancy, in particular, of 
various manifestation of political Islam: the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and 
the domestic and international ramification of the Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979.4
Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the seizure of the US embassy, Iran’s relations 
with the West have been badly strained and often inconsistent. Islamic Revolution in Iran 
was a turning point in the Islamic World, as the new government declared that Iran would be 
managed based on the Islamic principles and Iran would pursue a policy based on the 
principle of non-alignment.  
 It also 
became apparent from this time more generally that attempts by Middle Eastern states to 
‘secularize their politics’ sometimes led to a ‘political backlash form Islamists’ (Featherstone 
1990: 22-23). 
After September 11 some had gone even further, pointing to the resurgence of religion as 
a direct threat to international stability. They suggest that after the Cold War and the rapid 
demise of an ‘evil empire’ had soon given way to a much more complex and anarchic 
international order beset by and array of new security challenges and conflict situation which 
proved to be largely fluid in content and irregular in nature. They point to the rise of ‘Islam 
militancy’ as evidence for their case (Esposito 1997: 9-10). Their subjects of study, namely 
                                                          
4 After the Islamic Revolution, the new government declared that Iran would pursue a policy based on 
the principle of non-alignment. This was a strategy initiated by prominent leaders of the developing 
world in order to pursue a foreign policy independent of the great powers at the start of the Cold War. 
In the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini captured in his best know motto the principles of 
independence and freedom along side Islam.  




the Islamic activists on the other hand, are constantly trying to seize the moment and 
capitalize on the opportunities created by the new disorder to redraw the existing 
international system in term that they perceive to be to the Muslim’s advantage. Islamist 
engagement with the international system can easily be misconstrued, however, if not viewed 
within its proper context. 
In the following section, I study Islamism as a political phenomenon. I argue that 
Islamism in its radical form inspires only a minority. But because many of those who 
embrace it are highly motivated and idealistic, it exerts a wide influence in many Muslim 
countries and across the globe, even among those who do not realize its implications or 
understand its principles. 
 
 
3. ISLAMISM AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 
 
It is important to stress that though ‘Islamism’ and ‘political Islam’ broadly refers to 
those who are committed to applying an ideological vision of Islam in the socio-political 
sphere. They do not recommend violence, and they want to use political means to reach their 
objectives. Indeed, committed ‘radical Islamists’ are fringe groups in the world of Islam who 
use violence to get their objectives; so they can be called as terrorist groups in the Islamic 
world. Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that far form being a movement that concerns 
only the West, ‘radical Islamism’, as a political current and in all its forms, is also recognized 
as problematic by Muslims in general. 
There are several distinct ways in which one can study political Islam as a radical force in 
the modern world. The first approach sees it as a response to the monumental crisis of the 
nation-state in the Muslim Middle East, which has been caused by a combination of factors 
in the economic, political and social realms. The Crisis of Middle East and North Africa state 
is often expressed in terms of social deprivation, lingering poverty, corruption, nepotism, 
reliance on the West for security and defense, dependence on the West for economic 
assistance, diminishing degree of political legitimacy, absence of the rule of law, problems of 
stability associated with unclear political succession procedure, and unaccountable and 
unresponsive political systems.  These problems have been compounded in recent years by 
rapid population growth, haphazard urbanization, and environmental degradation. Therefore, 
radical Islam could be said to be an extremist response to a general crisis. It seems the 
Islamic reconstruction response to the sociopolitical crisis in the Middle East represents the 
attempts of Muslims to retrieve their own religious heritage and make it the foundation of a 
new public order. 
In the second approach Islamic radicalism is viewed as a form of cultural nationalism, a 
native response to the weakening of traditional structures. It can be said, in this view, that 
political Islam was a reaction to Muslim cultural erosion. Islamism is a passing, and badly 
misperceived, revivalist movement which poses little danger to the West, and is in actual fact 
a vital part of the cultural renewal of the Third World people. Moreover, fundamentalist 
movements are seen as no more than a response to the process of globalization, which in all 
of its aspects challenges standards and ways of life of non-Western world.  
It is important to emphasize that though Islamism generally refers to those who are 
dedicated to applying an ideological vision of Islam in the socio-political sphere, its 
expression differ and not all Islamists connect to violence. Indeed, dedicated radical Islamists 
are fringe groups in the world of Islam. Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that far from 
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being a movement that concerns only the West, Islamism as political current and in all its 
forms, is also recognized as challenging by Muslims in general. It is addressed by a number 
of Muslim thinkers concerned with Islam as their religion, its role in the world and the 
common good of their society. It cannot swank an acceptance by the mainstream Muslim 
community. And although some may tacitly ignore their activities, other Muslims are driven 
to question the competence of their leaders, and even the very basis of their faith at the sight 
of what other Muslims (i.e. Islamists) are doing in the name of Islam. 
Islamism itself is a term difficult to define without falling into misleading generalizations. 
It is commonly used in European academic and media vernacular to refer to politically active 
groups that call upon Islam in their political rhetoric and activism as Islamists, not simply as 
Muslims. The term is intended to emphasize the fact that this religiously based political 
rhetoric and activism goes beyond and is qualitatively different to works of devotions, social 
welfare and acts of faithfulness that constitute the norms of Islamic praxis. Islamism, then, is 
a term engaging a range of significance. It is different in character to what is referred to by 
the equally ambiguous word, fundamentalism. Though the term fundamentalism is at times 
used interchangeably with Islamists, there are Muslims who disapprove of the use of this 
word, noting that all observing Muslims are necessarily fundamentalists by virtue of 
accepting the Qur’an as the revealed word of Allah. Islamism represents the height of a 
commitment to Islam to the level of an ideology, and refers to groups who use Islam as a 
reference to define their political identities. Such groups include political parties that profess 
to be Islamic parties in their political activities. The extreme manifestation of radical 
Islamism is seen in the activities of those who see Islam as a universalistic ideology on the 
world stage, as a system to put to rights what they deem as the imbalance and injustice in the 
world. Stimulated by this confidence, they approach Islam with a view to molding it 
according to their aspirations and political agendas, and use it as a justification for the use of 
terror as a political weapon.  
Meanwhile, in this new international environment, especially after the Cold War and 
hastening in the process of globalization, more developments are shaping without the direct 
involvement of nations or states. The new antagonisms which are said to driving 
international relations are increasingly based on such variables as culture, group identity and 
religion. With the state still acting as the dominant partner in the international politics, 
confrontations based on these factors have increased in our planet and have added to the 
existing forms of inter-state tensions. Furthermore, the situation is exacerbated by 
globalization, which has not only increased interdependencies of countries and regions, but 
has also reduced the distinction between the ‘national’ and the ‘international’ (Piscatori 
1986: 21-23).  
A cluster of extreme groups, broadly referred to as radical Islamists, have appropriated 
the rhetoric of Islam, applying it to a promised ‘Islamic’ reality to be realized once ‘Islam is 
fully applied’. They have put Islam’s spiritual course at the service of an ideology that 
promotes their own program, for use as an instrument to right the wrongs they see 
everywhere in the world. Of these radical Islamist groups, a few have used their ideology to 
make of the Qur’an a heavenly command to use terror as a means of achieving political goals, 
in a way that perverts much of the moral, spiritual and cultural achievements of Islam in 
history (Huband 1998: 19-22). These few have, unfortunately, dominated public perceptions 
of Islam in the West, largely because of the amazing incidents they have masterminded, of 




which September 11 is an example.5
Islamism in its radical form inspires only a minority. But because many of those who 
embrace it are highly motivated and idealistic, it exerts a wide influence in many Muslim 
countries and across the globe, even among those who do not realize its implications or 
understand its principles. It colors, skews even, many outsiders’ perceptions of what is 
happening in the Muslim world and of what Muslims are, and has generated a new order on 
the international scene (Dekmejian 1995: 13-23), It is by drawing on the resources of 
international communication, e.g. media, satellite television and the internet, that Islamism 
has managed to create an identifiable international presence with the capacity to create and 
activate groups dedicated to it across the globe. In other words, globalization has allowed 
greater flows of information and people between the region and other parts of the Muslim 
world. 
  Such groups have abridged Islam to an ideology with 
specific formula, one that draws on some elements of a quantity of goals and values, and 
eschews others. This ideology is given an ‘Islamic’ character by combination of the rhetoric 
of its political goals with verses from the Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet. The resulting 
ideology is, then, said to be genuinely Islamic and as such is eagerly available for all to 
whom it makes an application. Its authority is enhanced because it enlists God in its cause, 
and rhetoric in which it is packaged and appeared to give to its appeal the blessing of religion 
(Espositro 1992: 33-34) 
Somehow, pattern of clash between civilizations, Islam and the West, has created the 
chimera conflict and hate. But the clash is more complex, and the prime victims are mainly 
Muslim living in Muslim countries. As a result, there is now in both the Islamic world and 
the West a web of confused and confrontational identities:  Muslims fearing other Muslims, 
non-Muslims fearing or suspicious of Muslims, Muslims suspicious and angry on non-
Muslims for suspecting that they are feared by them because they are Muslims, and even 
non-Muslims angry of other non-Muslims for not being anti-Muslim enough, and so putting 
the non-Muslim world at jeopardy. 
While it may be said that presence of political Islam in the Western-dominated 
international system is a destabilizing factor, the same could be said about the impact of 
Western policies on the Islamic world. The ‘US led anti-Soviet campaign in the 1980s was 
conducted through the use of Islamist organizations that used the conflict to further their own 
agenda’ (Jurgensmeyer 1993: 27-32). More recently, other instruments were employed, 
including the rather unusual one of an ostensible concern for women’s welfare as a reason to 
defend the international order. This gender reasoning has allowed the US to claim the right to 
intervene in the case of Afghanistan. But although abuse of and discrimination against 
women there still continues, now that the Western military mission of defeating the Taliban 
regime is finished, gender issues have once again returned to a mere domestic concern.6
Islamism is a product of clashes of interests, of colonialism, Islamic and Western, process 
 
                                                          
5 It should be said that the idea of perpetual armed jihad is just a theological construct offered by the 
scholars in tat specific period, not a divine injunction, in response to the prevailing reality of an 
international system this anarchic and during which war as an important instrument of power and 
security oriented.  
6 The anger in the Islamic world created by its foreign policies is mainly based on America’s one-sided 
support of Israel at the expense of Palestinians, its hegemonic role in military invasion in Iraq and its 
support for creation social reforms relating to liberty and governance in Muslim states because of its 
great concern with strategic and economic interests.  
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of de-colonization, and the materialization of modern dictatorial Muslim states supported by 
Western neo-colonial powers. The end of European colonialism has up to the present left the 
world with ongoing problems of re-adjustment, due to the arbitrary borders, economic, ethnic 
and religious aberrations left by and imposed on the territories fixed out by the former 
metropolitan powers. These were exacerbated in the course of the Cold War as Soviet Russia 
competed with their former colonial masters to maintain a privileged status and exercise 
economic and ideological control over their former possessions. The result has been a 
sometimes bumpy and erratic development in their political structures, the consequence of 
revolutions, coups and attempts at the re-drawing of borders. 
In the following section, I argue the interrelationships among Islam, Muslim polities and 
the West. I discuss that steps should be taken to promote a new Western message of cultural 
coexistence internally as well as abroad. A change in popular Western perceptions would be 
immediately perceived by Arabs and Muslim overseas who follow Western culture and 
media far more closely than is generally recognized. By acknowledging Islamic contribu-
tions to a common global civilization, and by including “Islamic perspective” in interfaith 
discussions and programs, the West could facilitate a process of intercultural peacemaking. 
 
 
4. ISLAM, MUSLIM POLITIES AND THE WEST 
 
Since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center the Western powerful states 
have been more firmly than ever on the Muslim world. All aspects of life and society in 
Muslim World have been pored over by policy makers and analysts in attempts to understand 
the real causes of Islamic radicalism. The operating assumption of most western policy 
makers and analysts has been that instability in the Islamic world, especially in the Middle-
East region including North Africa, poses a direct security challenge to international security. 
Meanwhile, the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States have led to a kind of 
‘Western Radicalism’ (Adib-Moghaddam 2002: 207-208). While in the past policy makers 
might have content to advocate a strategy of containing the threat, now they have to seek 
active intervention in the Muslim World to effect real and qualitative change in these 
societies through substantive political and economic reforms. 
Despite the differences in nature between the conventional Muslim’s and the Islamists’ 
commitment to Islam, for many non-Muslims, the distinction between them is indistinct. 
There are a number of reasons for this. One of them is that the epistemology of Islam is 
skewed by vagueness of the terms used to assign its trends and tendencies. Because of 
Islamism’s constantly reiterated claim to authenticity, a superior commitment to the Islamic 
revelation, for many non-Muslim across the globe, Islam itself has come to be seen as 
synonymous with Islamism in its radical symptom and so with terrorism. Further, the 
political pattern of the world, and the reputation of expressions such as ‘Islam and the West’ 
has resulted in the general use of the word ‘Islam’ as a conceptual noun which phonetically 
is suggestive Islamism. Another reason is that Islamism in the general and legal sense of the 
word is nevertheless Muslims. They are so even if they deliberately hijack elements from the 
Islamic tradition and ‘fashion them into the rhetoric they use to present their own agenda is a 
way that goes well beyond the parameters of generally accepted Islamic belief, norms and 
values’7
                                                          
7 It would be too simplistic to see the multitude of international tensions arising from the politicization 
 (Guazzone 1995: 14-15).  




To explain the behavior in the Islamic World, some Western analysts are claiming that 
the problem has always lain within the Muslim world itself and Islam’s inability to adapt to 
the modern age (Lewis 2002: 22-27). This explanation has been setting the theme of much of 
the policy debate in the West about the complexities of Muslim societies, shackled by the 
teaching and practices of Islam are said to be as apprehensive and unbalanced as to create a 
‘direct threat to international security’; while their shortcomings mean that they are ‘ill 
prepared’ to manage the challenges of globalization on their own (Huntington 2001: 88). 
The allegation, that Islam, as theological doctrine, is responsible for the conduct of a 
group of Muslims, such as al-Qa’ida, is responsible for the actions of a faction of Muslims 
who say they act in their religion’s name is every bit as unsubstantiated as the claim that 
Christianity is responsible for the extremes of medieval Crusaders, or the implication that 
Judaism is to blame for the Israeli government’s failure to fully apply the fourth Geneva 
Convention (Hefner 2001: 493-495). 
Meanwhile, the American strategy for counteracting terrorism and building international 
security lacks both consistency and a reliable strategy for implementing America’s best 
values. As America’s leaders inelegantly fight fire with both fire and water, they rely far 
more on provocative foreign policy than on a real understanding of the flashpoints and 
firebreaks in American-Islamic relations (Lynch 2003: 91).  
During Bush administration, while one strand of US policy projects official messages of 
good will toward Muslims and seeks to advertise American values through public diplomacy, 
it has mostly redressed problems of international terrorism and weapons proliferation 
unilaterally, through intimidation and projection of military power. Instead of proactive 
agenda to strengthen global governance and deal with root causes, Bush administration 
produced a hasty foreign policy whose bellicosity threatens to do what al-Qa’ida could not 
convince the world’s Muslim that US policy really does oppose their interests and values. 
Where many American see policies animated by ideological consistency and even moral 
precision, Muslim see double standards and moral insolvency. The resulting perceptual gap, 
and the demonstrable hardship experiences, such as by Palestinians and occupied Iraqis, have 
fed a deep pessimism about American politics. American strong support of continued Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is another example. Nor are American concerns 
about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction regarded as believable given past US indifference to 
the use of these weapons against Iranians and Kurds during Iraq’s invasion of Iran, not to 
mention the way the American non-proliferation agenda seems driven more by power 
politics, and an attendant policyof “selective proliferation,” than by any consistent set of 
principles. After all, allies and terrifying adversaries are permitted to maintain stockpiles of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, whereas challenges to the status quo are not. The 
American desire to spread democracy is viewed with similar irony, given historical US 
pattern of support for Middle Eastern monarchs, and for “99% majority” presidents whose 
failure to provide dynamic, progressive, and accountable leadership has greatly enhanced the 
                                                          
of Islam merely in Islamic-Western terms. That this should not be so is evident from two sets of 
considerations. First, much of venom of radical Islam is still injected into the Muslim world itself, 
where considerable violence is traded amongst Muslims themselves, as it were. Second, Militant 
Islam takes as much pleasure in confronting such non-Western powers as Russia, China, India, Burma 
and Philippines as it dies their Western counterparts. Broadly speaking, in the worldview of militant 
Islamists, Muslim are victims of aggression from a multitude of sources, which includes the Eastern 
Churches, Hindu and Buddhist movements as well as all secular forces around the world.    
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appeal of radical Islamic outlook. When speculating about America’s intentions, Muslims 
consider not ‘only contradictions’ of word and deed but also the resumes and public 
statements of those who formulate American foreign policy (Ramadan 2004: 274-275). 
With Muslims’ historical experiences, American should not be surprised that most 
Middle Easterners view military invasion of Iraq and its occupation as actually a campaign to 
subjugate Arabs and Muslims, within the well-established traditions of Western imperialism. 
From a Muslim standpoint, official American pronouncements of respect for Islam are much 
easier to explain than policies that instead manifest either a deliberate bias or an inability to 
comprehend the needs, aspirations, and fears of others. After all, it is politically expedient for 
American leaders to ‘profess respect for Islam and for Muslim values’ (Salvatore and 
Eickelman 2004: 16-21). 
To counteract terrorism and achieve genuine security, Americans need a policy that 
inspires active cooperation for mutual gains rather than a program of fear and compulsion. 
International terrorism has complex causes, and is fed by a growing alienation, between 
societies and the failure of existing local and global governance to meet minimal 
expectations of opportunity, efficiency and justice. Such problems cannot be resolved 
exclusively- or even largely- through intimidation. A policy that combines a clear and 
impartial message about terrorism with respect for the existential realities, interests, and 
future hopes of Muslims might open a new chapter of cooperative relations. But a policy that 
focuses on symptoms and ignores underlying factors could easily reinforce the widespread 
despair, resentment, and powerlessness that have enabled Bin Laden to attract a following.  
Developing an effective policy reaction to terrorism will occur only if we re-examine 
fundamental suppositions about Islam and its relationship to the West. 8
Another crucial step would be a transformed US commitment to a negotiated resolution 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in agreement with international standards of legitimacy as 
well as with the shared needs of Israeli and Palestinians for human security. United States 
leaders should actively cooperate with its partners, the United Nations, the European Union, 
and Russia in the mediation process. The US should efforts(?) in conflicts between Arabs 
 To date Western 
approach to relations with the Muslim world has suffered from deep contradictions and 
inconsistencies. Former US administration’s policies since the tragic events of September 11 
divided natural allies and done much to persuade average, apolitical Muslims. Still, there is 
no reason for fatalism about a clash of civilizations, since a vast majority of Muslims would 
prefer having America as an ally rather than an enemy. By stressing both the cultural and 
political roots of the present stalemate, advocates for a new foreign policy vision, predicated 
upon coexistence and peaceful change, can have an important impact on public discourse. 
They can serve as intellectual bridge builders, formulating a message and agenda to which 
both Americans and Muslim might wish to subscribe. The West needs a policy framework 
with a different tone and intention. This means defining the nature and objectives of the 
struggle against terrorism more specifically, establishing non-military criteria for success, 
and framing direct as well as ‘structural and cultural violence’ in American-Islamic relation 
as shared problems (Kepel 2002: 16-18). 
                                                          
8 The roots of this confrontation have been discussed by many academics and analysts before, but many 
of them have neglected the important connections between today's affairs with past events.  Many of 
these studies have ignored the background of different perspective towards the US.  In simple-minded 
and mechanistic analyses, they perceive a “good boy,” “bad boy” dichotomy in this regard. This 
normative interpretation has been misleading as they mainly neglect many other variables in the study. 




and Israelis as well as Westerners and Muslims. Such efforts would actively join civil society 
leaders to balance official diplomacy, and seek the counsel of Muslims, Christians and Jews 
in formulating policies that respond to those aspects of contemporary conflicts that ‘fall 
outside the purview of traditional statecraft’ (Midlarsky 1998: 486-487). 
Meanwhile, steps should be taken to promote a new Western message of cultural 
coexistence internally as well as abroad. A change in popular Western perceptions would be 
immediately perceived by Arabs and Muslim overseas who follow Western culture and 
media far more closely than is generally recognized. By acknowledging Islamic 
contributions to a common global civilization, and by including “Islamic perspective” in 
interfaith discussions and programs, the West could facilitate a process of intercultural 
peacemaking. To achieve human security in the global system, the West needs a policy 
stranded in cultural understanding, multilateralism, and expansive consensus about interests, 
values, and hopes that are widely shared in the international community. By calling for 
reverential dialogue and mutual commitment, we can help to transform a legacy of pain, 
producing a deeper knowledge of what the other has to say, a more realistic understanding of 
present opportunities and dangers, and a stable basis for cultural peace. 
Many Islamic figures took up the call for dialogue, urgently calling for moderation and 
cooperation to avoid an escalation into a clash of civilizations. The invasion of Iraq without 
the approval of the Security Council, and in the face of unparalleled global public opposition, 
left the US deeply isolated and resented. Beyond this situation, dialogues between the West 
and Islam was challenged by the existence of important societal actors in the Islamic world 
and in the US alike, who believe that a conflict is desirable or necessary, and have access to 
strong arguments to make it happen. It is not only the hardliners and extremists who reject 
dialogue. Many Western liberals withdraw from the religious and socially conservative 
views of the Islamic moderates with whom they might engage in such dialogue, while many 
moderate Islamists fiercely oppose US foreign policy in the Middle East affair suggests, 
many on both sides despair of the existence or the desirability of interlocutors on the other 
side with whom to talk. 
In contemporary international situation, we can find several new conditions that suggest a 
real possibility for a politically momentous global dialogue about Islam and the West.9
It should be emphasized that the resources, the potential and the will to engage in such a 
dialogue do exist within the Islamic world. Against those who see Islam as uniformly radical 
 First, 
many cases of international terrorism and their consequences generated a corresponding 
sense of insecurity and fear which create a demand for such a dialogue on the part of the 
powerful. Communicative dialogue requires a willingness to set aside considerations of 
power and self-interest which seemed quite implausible prior to 11 September. The second 
new condition lay in the emergence of a virtually unprecedented issue-specific global public 
sphere focused on the question of the relations between Islam and the West. Whereas in the 
past the dialogue of civilizations had been the domain of experts, mainly manifested in 
conferences bringing together cosmopolitan elites, after September 11 their subjects became 
the dominant topic of political debates involving political leaders and cultural figures, mass 
publics and elites, intellectuals and religious leaders, private conferences and mass media.  
                                                          
9 The Islamic image of the West is inseparable form Western policies, especially the US’s policy 
towards the Islamic World and its global politics. The West needs a better understanding of Islamic 
societies and it should distinguish Islam from terrorism and abandon double- standard policies 
regarding issues such as human rights.   
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and deeply hostile, and against similar views in the Arab-Islamic world which see the US as 
an implacable enemy, a meaningful dialogue can be established. Such a dialogue could 
change the terms of the interaction between Islam and the West, in part by breaking the 
monopoly over representation claimed by radicals on either side. Therefore, a number of 
forces work in favor of global dialogue about Islam and the West:  the existence of an 
emerging global public sphere strongly focused on the issue; the emergence of a new Muslim 
public sphere committed to open and critical public debate; the existence of important and 
influential public figures willing to participate; and a growing recognition of the urgent 
political need for such a dialogue. But it should be mentioned that a demand for dialogue 
does not necessarily make it possible. The insecurity, fear and anger generated by terrorism 
and war might paradoxically help ‘to reduce the effects of imbalances of power and a 
meaningful dialogue’ (Risse 2000: 37-39). 
The existences of conditions conductive to dialogue are necessary such as a shared life-
world, some level of trust, a willingness to set aside identities and power. International 
politics in general and relations between the West and the Islamic world in particular, rarely 
approximate such conditions. The extremism of Osama bin Laden and the shocking atrocities 
of al-Qaida’s terrorism clearly succeeded in convincing many Westerners of the 
impossibility of dialogue with Islam. (Elshtain, 2003: 46-48) Meanwhile, The US war on 
terror convinced many Muslims of the same thing. Such refusal of dialogue in a real sense 
grants victory to terrorists, whose violence pointedly aims ‘to destroy trust and spread fear of 
the other, and to establish that extremists really do speak for their community’ (Zaharna 
2003: 33-35).  
In the following section, I discuss the necessity of mutual understanding of political Islam 
and the West. I argue that this conflict must not be allowed to become a clash of civilizations 
between Islam and the West, extremists must not be allowed to hijack and dominate the 
discourses in the West and the Islamic world, the search for security and revenge should not 
be allowed to undermine the moral fabric of our societies.  
 
 
5. POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE WEST: FROM DISCORD TO UNDERSTANDING 
 
There is a deep spirit between Islam and the Western civilization. Like Christians and 
Jews, Muslims share a common calling to work for peace, and enjoined by the Quran. The 
shared cultural roots jointing Islam and the West are too often forgotten. Classical Islamic 
Civilization was constructed out of Arab, Biblicist, and Hellenic cultures, but cast a wider net 
by integrating Persian, Central Asian, and Indian mechanism within its cultural synthesis. 
Historically, Islam is the true bridge between West and East. It can be noted that, Islam’s 
Hellenism was mediated primarily through Eastern Christian intellectual circles, and 
important streams of Muslim Philosophical and scientific thought still remain and 
understudies field linking Late Antiquity with the Renaissance.  
It can be said, what is often viewed as a clash of civilizations is really a clash of symbols. 
The symbols on the one side are headscarves, turbans, and other symbols of Islamic religious 
expression that Westerners often find repellant, just a fundamentalist Muslims view much of 
Western culture as anti-Islamic. Moreover, cultural contact between Islam and the West has 
been spoiled by historically unequal power relations, leaving the West arrogant and 
inspective and the Muslim world defensive and insecure.(Buck-Morss 2003: 17-19) Western 
arrogance breeds contempt and fanaticism on the Islamic side, and there is evidence of 




paranoia on both sides. (Brown 2000: 207) The Islamic world is offended by the West’s 
cultural and triumphalism, backed up by overwhelming military force. This is interpreted by 
some Muslims as a new Crusade. The West and the Islamic world are out of touch with each 
other. Before the West can effectively express its intentions, it has to understand what is 
going on it the Arab and Muslim world today. This involved active listening to the voices 
from the region and engaging with them in sustained dialogue. 
Islam and the West have the ability to develop and a new mutually rewarding relationship. 
Such a relationship would be premised not on ideas of cultural superiority, but on mutual 
respect and openness to cultural eclecticism. Muslims and Westerners can learn from each 
other and cooperate in pursuit of humane values. The West and Islam are not destined to 
meet as rivals. ‘The West can give Islam the best that it has in exchange for the best of 
Islam’ (Said 2003: 341-344). 
It seems that the idea of perpetual armed jihad is just a theological construct offered by  
the scholars in that period, not a divine injunction, in response to the prevailing reality of a 
international system that is anarchic and during which war as an important instrument of 
power and security predominated. In this respect, one can find supporting arguments from 
conventional international relations tradition such as offensive realism, which holds that the 
anarchic international system provides strong incentives for states to continuously strive for 
maximum accumulation of power in relation to other states because security is best 
guaranteed by achieving a hegemonic power. In doing so, states pursue expansionist policies 
when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. ‘A non-hegemonic power in an 
anarchic international system is in constant worry that other states will use force to harm or 
conquer’ (Halliday 1995: 33-4). 
Islam does play a role in international relations. We cannot understand the politics of the 
Middle-East, for example, without some references to it. But the contribution of Islam to 
politics is not ‘independent’. The fault-lines of conflict are not drawn between Islamic and 
non-Islamic governments or movements, let alone between and Islamic world and the rest. A 
helpful understanding of the role of religion is one that takes into account the social, 
economic, and political concerns that lie behind the religious terminology or imagery. 
Mundane and universal issues such as social justice, political legitimating, and the defence of 
the homeland reveal themselves behind the surface of Islamic politics. This is not to claim 
that religious discourse is reducible to material concerns or simply a facade. Spiritual and 
moral issues are often really at stake in religious politics. But the interpretation of religion as 
such is a fluid one. It evolves in constant interaction with specific historical conditions. This 
approach to Islam developed above can be applied to the study of international relations and 
religion generally. ‘The recent interest in religion and culture as important factors in 
international relations is commendable and only redress a curious and unhelpful neglect’ 
(Simbar 2008: 65-66). 
This conflict must not be allowed to become a clash of civilizations between Islam and 
the West, extremists must not be allowed to hijack and dominate the discourses in the West 
and the Islamic world, and the search for security and revenge should not be allowed to 
undermine the moral fabric of our societies. When the US responds to the murder of innocent 
people with massive attacks that kill more innocent people, then it is merely responding to 
terror with terror. The best way to ensure that this war on terror does not escalate is by 
advancing a new discourse. Unlike the present discourse whose central themes are Islamic 
terrorism and Western colonialism, we need to explore themes that talk about bridging the 
gap between democratic values and American foreign policy. The new discourse will emerge 
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if the moderates within the Muslim world and in the West seriously begin collective 
exercises in self-reflection and self-criticism ‘to bridge the chasm between values and 
practices, deed and words, ideas and realities’ (Hunter 1998: 11-17). 
The Islamic community today finds itself engaged in a profound struggle in this crucial 
moment of its history, effectively cut off from the past, faced with a present that is 
characterized by tyranny, poverty, and humiliation, with no viable or desirable prospects for 
creating its own future. Muslims have much to gain from understanding the West and its 
hard-won achievements in the realm of political coexistence. Democracy is scarce in the 
Islamic world today, but this is more the result of a lack of Islamic social institution for it and 
not because of an absence of religious and cultural foundation. Islamic social institutions are 
more dynamic and variegated than is generally recognized; they provide the basis for 
genuine participation. Today’s challenge for Muslims lies in the expansion of the original 
ideas of Islam, and a willingness to demonstrate curiosity about historical experiences and 
achievements of the West. Muslim moderates must become aggressive in their dealings with 
extremists in their midst. The first step is to recognize that when moderates remain silent 
extremists speak for all. Those Muslims who do not wish to be represented by the likes of 
Osama bin Laden must speak out loud and clear. 
Most important for both communities is active engagement with one another, through 
sustained dialogue, permittimg each to understand the deep meaning, associations, and 
implications of the prevailing clash of symbols referred to above. The West needs to recoil 
from Islamic symbols, as they do not represent anti-Western, anti-secular, irrational 
extremism. The West remains secure enough to uncover the extent to which a deeper 
pathology has been clothed in religious rhetoric. Active engagement permits us to understand 





      
One of the main elements of the post-Cold War conflict lies in the struggle between 
political Islam originating in the Middle East region and the Western dominated international 
system led by the US and subscribed to by the West’s allies in the Middle East. Although 
most of the world’s 1.1 billion Muslims live outside of the this region, and not every person 
living in the Muslim Middle East is in fact a Muslim, the politicization of Islam is perhaps 
most evident in this region. Not exclusively, however, recent examples from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Kenya demonstrate a widening 
pattern. Therefore, Islam does not have just one voice in today’s complex world, nor is 
political Islam a huge force. Actually, the very term political Islam is itself undermanned for 
a diverse set of opinions, where the Islamic groups themselves have many fundamental 
differences with each other. These movements do not represent a single political force, 
neither at home or internationally.Furthermore, we can discern that Islamists are still split 
doctrinally between those adhering to the majority sect of Islam (Sunnis) and the minority 16 
percent of Shi’is.   
There are several distinct ways in which one can study political Islam as a radical force in 
the modern world. The first approach sees it as a response to the monumental crisis of the 
nation-state in the Muslim Middle East, which has been caused by a combination of factors 
in the economic, political and social realms. The Crisis of Middle East and North Africa state 




is often expressed in terms of social deprivation, lingering poverty, corruption, nepotism, 
reliance on the West for security and defense, dependence on the West for economic 
assistance, diminishing degree of political legitimacy, absence of the rule of law, problems of 
stability associated with unclear political succession procedure, and unaccountable and 
unresponsive political systems.  These problems have been compounded in recent years by 
rapid population growth, haphazard urbanization, and environmental degradation. Therefore, 
radical Islam could be said to be an extremist response to a general crisis. It seems the 
Islamic reconstruction response to the sociopolitical crisis in the Middle East represents the 
attempts of Muslims to retrieve their own religious heritage and make it the foundation of a 
new public order. 
To understand how and why certain anti-rational tendencies have gained ground in the 
Islamic world, we need to consider their historical and socio-political context, including the 
official state policies, notably the attempt to crush major mainstream Islamist movements 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the cancellation of Algeria’s elections. To this, 
the manipulation of religion by ruling elites and opposition movements alike should be added. 
In the cultural sphere, the narrow educational curricula of certain Islamic schools, including 
the traditional religious faculty of al-Azhar in Cairo, and the tendency to impose narrow oral 
censorship in the name of Islam have seriously stifled intellectual and cultural life. 
Although Islamists lay claim to power in the political as well as religious spheres, and 
much of their activity is heading for against the West, Islam itself is not necessarily the prime 
reason or even the channel for this occurrence. Rather, it can be argued that it is the political 
background in which their views have taken shape, rather than their religious ideals, that is 
catalyst for the expansion of the movement. The political realities influencing this context 
can be seen as internal and external to their societies. As for those that are internal, in many 
Muslim countries, there is little room for the politics of opposition. Political opposition is 
likely to result in consequences ranging form imprisonment, self-exile or even extra-judicial 
assassination. In some countries, opposition political parties do exist, but for little more than 
superficial purposes.They have negligible influence on policy. While it would be an 
overstatement to say that all the Muslim world is run by dictators, authoritarian tendencies 
are all too often evident in the government of many of its states. As for the external factors, 
they are equally pernicious. It seems US policies have contributed to the radicalization of 
Islamist movements. Despite its metaphorical posture in favor of democracy worldwide, 
Washington possesses a tacit sense that representative government in most Muslim states 
will be less submissive to American interests than the current generation of dictatorial 
leaders. Indeed, Western nations were not only ‘excusing’, but also contribution to this lack 
of freedom in the Middle East. In the oppressive political climate of many Muslim countries, 
a current such as Islamism has at its disposal a transcendental claim to authority deriving 
form its appeal to religion, and is able to use it effectively as a vehicle for the expression of 
dissent. 
It is not difficult to see reasons for and animus against the West as a further constituent of 
the inspiration driving Islamism. We have already referred to the role of the West among the 
external influence maintaining authoritarian regimes in power.  There are others. It seems 
that Islamists are convinced that the only way to triumph over the power of the West, and the 
unfaithfulness of its scheming against Islam and the Muslim world, is to unite Muslims 
through the realization of the inner resources of a strong political and spiritual identity, i.e. 
Islam itself, which they all share. From this, one may argue that the Islamists response to 
such perceived threats, though on the surface religious, is primarily a reaction to internal 
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factors in many Muslim countries. The West is perceived as complicit in the authority that 
their governments enjoy. 
Political Islam takes as much pleasure in confronting such non-Western powers as Russia, 
China, India, Burma and the Philippines as it does their Western counterparts. Broadly 
speaking, in the worldview of militant Islamists, Muslims are victims of aggression from 
multitude of sources, which includes the Eastern churches, Hindu and Buddhist movements 
as well as secular forces around the world. Militant Islam thus operates in a world of intra-
civilization one. It engages in battles with Muslims within the Muslim world itself, with 
outsiders at the nodes of contact with the Muslim world, as well as increasingly with non-
Muslim on their home territory.  
As it evident from its rise, political Islam has found it particularly hard to compromise the 
Muslim world, what it regards to be the Muslim region in political economy terms, to global 
pressure befalling all other actors in the international system. It has resisted outside pressures 
and has opposed what it sees as the exploitation, fragmentation and domination of the region 
of Islam or Muslim region by the West. The concern about the integrity of the Muslim region 
has provided the most vital stimulant for trans-boundary international action. 
It is reasonable to suggest that radical Islam has failed to gain state power and has failed 
in its main mission of liberating Muslim lands form Western influence and convincing the 
Muslim masses of the virtues of its brand of Jihad. But this is remain militant, to undertake 
sophisticated military-style operation, or to generally pose a serous security challenge to 
Western interests worldwide. Finally, the tensions between radical Islam and the West, 
which have become a major concern of contemporary world politics, stem from the fact that 
the former, arguably representing a form of cultural nationalism, has to respond to the 
process of global Westernization and the means used to pull up the world.  
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